Page 11 - The Indian EYE 061926

OPINION JUNE 19, 2026 | The Indian Eye 11

A zero-day vulnerability discov- intelligence agencies, national cyber
ered and exploited at machine speed authorities, critical infrastructure
can transform a battlefield advantage operators, the defence industry, and
into an operational liability. The crit- academia around shared standards,
ical question for military planners is information exchange, coordinated
therefore not merely what capability vulnerability management and joint
a technology delivers, but what vul- exercises. An equivalent of Project
nerability it introduces and what mis- Glasswing of the US needs to be
sion impact will result if that technol- launched. National security is insepa-
ogy is compromised. rable from national digital resilience.
History suggests that resilient India’s simultaneous force mod-
forces retain the ability to fight when ernisation, digital infrastructure ex-
technology is denied, degraded, or pansion, indigenous defence technol-
deceived. GPS-based navigation may ogy development and AI investment
be faster and more accurate. Howev- create both significant opportunities
er, forces must still retain the ability and new attack surfaces. Priority ar-
to navigate through maps, terrain as- eas include:
sociation and celestial methods when • Sovereign, indigenous security
satellites are jammed or attacked. technologies for defence systems.
AI-assisted targeting may compress India’s simultaneous force modernisation, digital infrastructure expansion, indigenous de- • Secure defence cloud and trusted
sensor-to-shooter timelines, but fence technology development and AI investment create both significant opportunities and new semiconductor ecosystems.
commanders must still possess alter- • National cyber ranges and inte-
native procedures when algorithms attack surfaces (File Photo) grated test beds.
fail or are manipulated. • Advanced defensive AI tools and
A resilience assessment should continuous automated discovery of human approval for all AI-gener- vulnerability intelligence programs.
therefore accompany every tech- mission-critical vulnerabilities across ated fixes. Doctrine integrating cyber oper-
nology infusion: Can the mission military, civilian and industrial net- • Network Segmentation and Zero ations with MDO across digital, cog-
continue if a zero-day vulnerability works. Cyber exploitation in this con- Trust: Restrict lateral movement nitive, electromagnetic, space and
compromises the system? Is there a text becomes operational manoeuvre. within your network to contain kinetic domains.
manual fallback, a parallel architec- damage if a zero-day successfully Future conflicts involving India
ture, or an alternative means of ex- Security by Design executes. will not be fought through kinetic
ecution? In an era when AI can dis- With the above AI-enabled cy- • Critical questions must be answer- means alone. Preparedness demands
cover and weaponise vulnerabilities ber threat challenges, security cannot able before conflict: Can missions addressing these realities now.
faster than defenders can respond, be bolted on after development. It continue under degraded commu- Conclusion
the objective of modernisation is not must be a core design requirement— nications? Where are single points AI-generated zero-day vulner-
simply to become more digital but to alongside survivability, mobility, reli- of failure? How quickly can net- abilities mark a fundamental shift in
become more capable without be- ability and safety—with the explicit works recover? Without realistic the character of warfare. Cyber ex-
coming more fragile. The most effec- assumption that adversaries will ap- environments, many vulnerabili- ploitation will increasingly function
tive military force will not be the one ply advanced vulnerability discovery ties remain invisible until conflict as a manoeuvre capability—degrad-
with the most technology, but the techniques throughout the system’s exposes them. This needs to be ing command, disrupting logistics,
one that can continue to fight when entire service life. Every platform avoided at all costs. blinding sensors and slowing decision
that technology is under attack. must be assessed not only for kinetic Continuous validation in an cycles. For military organisations, the
performance but for cyber resilience. MDO environment is necessary, as
Cyber Exploitation as a Manoeuvre The question is not whether vulnera- periodic evaluation is incompatible implication is clear: cyber security
Capability must be embedded in force design,
An increase in ‘attack surfaces’ bilities exist; it is whether the mission with the modern threat tempo. Ev- capability development, operation-
for cyber exploitation in itself is not can survive despite them. ery major exercise must incorporate al planning and doctrine. The future
Testing platforms in isolation is
realistic cyber-attack scenarios: com-
a serious vulnerability. However, an insufficient; modern warfare requires munications disruption, data manip- will belong to the force that maintains
‘AI-enabled automated cyber-attack’ testing systems-of-systems. National ulation, autonomous system com- command integrity, preserves deci-
can generate cascading effects across test beds must replicate operational promise and decision-support tool sion superiority and continues fighting
every warfighting domain. A single networks, joint architectures, space failure. Commanders must learn to under continuous digital disruption.
vulnerability in a satellite ground sta- assets, tactical communications, au- operate in degraded digital environ- Lt Gen Karanbir Singh Brar, PVSM,
tion can degrade space links, disrupt tonomous platforms, and defence ments as routine practice. The force AVSM (Retd), is a former DG Ar-
unmanned system feeds, slow ISR, industrial supply chains—and sup- that fights through disruption holds a moured Corps and GOC Dakshin
extend strike timelines and reduce port continuous red-teaming with decisive operational advantage. Resil- Bharat Area. Presently, he is a Dis-
operational tempo—a flaw in cyber- advanced attack tools. Military net- ience is now a warfighting capability. tinguished Strategic Advisor with IIT
space generating effects in space, air works and architecture need to have Madras PRAVARTAK (Tech Innovation
and land simultaneously. the following: Whole-of-Government Hub of IITM).
An adversary need not compro- Imperative
mise every system—only the weakest • Detection-First/Behaviour-Based Automated vulnerabilities do Views expressed are of the author and
Architecture: Use endpoint solu-
digital pathway that yields dispro- tions that stop active execution not respect organisational bound- do not necessarily reflect the views of
portionate operational effect. Auto- and exploit-chain behaviour the aries. Military systems depend on the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
mated tools greatly enhance the abil- moment an attack occurs. civilian infrastructure; civilian in- Government of India.
ity to identify such pathways across • Automated AI Red Teaming: frastructure depends on private This article first appeared in the
command systems, logistics networks, Leverage autonomous AI agents industry; private industry depends Comments section of the website (www.
satellite assets, tactical communica- internally to find vulnerabilities in on global software supply chains. A idsa.in) of Manohar Parrikar Institute
tions, and defence-industrial supply your dependency graphs before whole-of-government approach is es- for Defense Studies and Analyses, New
chains. Future campaigns may feature
adversaries do, while maintaining sential, integrating the armed forces, Delhi, on June 8, 2026

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